Katrina offered multiple opportunities to learn lessons, but many have been ignored. It is fitting to review a few on this fifth anniversary, although media coverage has made Katrina a bit nauseating. However, the BP spill proves some major lessons were not learned from either Katrina or Valdez.One of the biggest can be called chain of command, but actually is under-empowerment. Brown, head of FEMA, took the major hit for Katrina, but responsibilities for the failures belong to his superiors. During the reorganization of government following 9/11, FEMA was made a minor department within Homeland Security. Instead of a cabinet post, head of FEMA was now several positions away from the President.
The original Secretary of Homeland Security was Tom Ridge, an ex-governor, who knew the importance of FEMA. Even so, FEMA was not seen as mainline to the primary mission of Homeland Security, and primary mission think eroded FEMA's budget, power and preparedness. When Chertoff took over, he did not have any background and it showed. Brown had submitted his resignation early in the year, but was talked into staying through hurricane season.
The biggest mistake Chertoff made was NOT appointing a Principal Federal Officer (PFO) before Katrina hit. In fact, that omission was not corrected for over a week until the appointment of Lt. Gen. Honoré, “The Ragin' Cajun.” As New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin so adroitly put it, "Now, I will tell you this -- and I give the president some credit on this -- he sent one John Wayne dude down here that can get some stuff done, and his name is Gen. Honoré. And he came off the doggone chopper, and he started cussing and people started moving. And he's getting some stuff done." The PFO had been appointed and empowered. His public exposure came when he told a reporter “Don't get stuck on stupid.” Had Honoré been appointed two days before Katrina, history would have been different.
When the BP Oil Spill was realized as serious, a PFO was appointed (April 30, 2010), but called National Incident Commander. Admiral Thad Allen got the appointment, and served in both that post and as Commandant of the Coast Guard until May 25, 2010. His empowerment was not total as indicated by response to a reporter's question about his chain of command. It was through various officials of Homeland Security before reaching the President. What this meant is illustrated by a proposal or request made by a Louisiana Parrish. The request was routed through 14 different federal departments, any of which could kill, modify, or simply delay the request. The Louisiana request to build 40 miles of berm to protect their wet lands from oil took 14 days to wind through the bureaucracy, coming back with only 6 miles approved. Several days later, it was also announced that BP would only pay for one mile.
Later while building the berm, a single official with the federal wildlife service forbid taking fill from a spot she considered a threat to later subsidence of an island the berm was to protect. Her requirement delayed building the berm until a pipe could be laid and assembled to a dredge offshore. The official asked why they couldn't just get volunteers to place the pipe. The pipe was so large one could ride an ATV down it, thus required a crane to lift each pipe section in place, then welders to connect them to adjacent sections. An empowered bureaucrat without a clue shows the main problem was a National Incident Commander without the power to command all the departments involved to be proactive in an emergency instead of impediments as usual.
A comparison story was from the Storm of the Century in 1993. The Emergency Manager of Buncombe County requested the NC Department of Transportation (DOT) equipment clear the way for the power company trucks to reach places necessary to restore power in the county. DOT refused, claiming their primary focus was to clear main roads first, then back roads in sequence of importance. The Emergency Manager, knowing the Governor, dialed his number from memory, told him of the problem with a colorful opinion of DOT performance, and hung up. Ten minutes later, DOT called the Emergency Manager, asking which roads he wanted cleared and in what sequence.
The National Incident Commander needs that link to authority, that empowerment. When Thad Allen was required to retire by law from the Coast Guard by June 30, 2010, he negotiated the needed power to stay on as National Incident Commander. He got it and he stayed. Had he not, July 1, he could have been on all news programs with an explanation of why he had not stayed, an intolerable prospect for national authority figures. Allen's new power was expressed by 76 approved exceptions to the EPA's ban on dispersant usage.
EPA did not object too loudly because it had failed to test dispersants in the 20 years since the Valdez spill, but, when greenies screamed, forbade further usage in the BP spill because “it might harm the environment.” The Brits had tested it, and approved unlimited usage more than 10 miles offshore. Testing within ten miles of shore did not happen because the Brits would not consider usage within coastal proximity. When Allen approved usage, EPA did not howl too loudly because of its embarrassing non-performance. When they did, Allen was nice to them by explaining that all 76 incidents were to prevent oil coming ashore.
Perhaps the EPA will test dispersants now, or just ban them as an appeasement to the greenies. Will the fed learn the lesson of appointing and empowering the National Incident Commander next time? We'll have to wait until next time to see.
